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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

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## UNO OFFERS BEST MEANS OF RECONCILING BIG-THREE CONFLICTS

THE undertow toward Big Three conflict that has been increasingly evident since the discovery of the atomic bomb, has gained dangerous momentum since Mr. Churchill's plea for a military alliance of the English-speaking countries, and Stalin's denunciation of that speech in an interview given to *Pravda* on March 13. Ostensibly not one of the Big Three wants war. Yet at the rate at which their relations are deteriorating, war might again become a stark reality—not, perhaps, a head-on collision such as that between Germany and Russia, or between the United States and Japan in World War II but, what would be even more disastrous, a long-drawn out series of explosions all over the world, with little prospect of clear-cut victory for either side and with ultimate disaster for all, even if no atomic bombs are used.

WOULD WAR WITH RUSSIA SOLVE WORLD PROBLEMS? Even assuming what now seems impossible, that the Western powers, combined in a coalition proposed by Mr. Churchill, could defeat Russia, would that resolve the problems that are causing the present crisis? Some people say it would, because they believe that many of the world's major maladjustments—labor unrest, threats of civil war, nationalist ferment in the colonies—are all directly traceable to the influence of Russia, which they at the same time denounce for its backwardness. If a country described as backward can exercise such far-reaching influence of a disruptive character, then the rest of the world must be in a very weakened condition indeed. But can the weakness of the British Empire, the internal divisions in China, the growing demand of labor and minority groups for a wider measure of participation in the benefits of industrial progress all be laid at Russia's door? Are they not, if we look at history in perspective, the natural concomitants of mankind's never-ending struggle for

greater freedom and opportunity, which takes different forms in different areas of the world, according to the rate and character of their previous political, economic and social development?

WESTERN POWERS MUST NOT EVADE RESPONSIBILITY. It is understandable that the rapid international changes now taking place should be particularly troubling to Britain, because the rise to world power of Russia, which has long challenged Britain's influence, happens to coincide with the decline in power of the British Empire. But the military defeat of Russia would not allay the nationalist aspirations of Arabs and Indians, nor would it ease Britain's political and economic tasks in India—where Americans, much more than Russians, have been critical of British methods. Nor would loss of power by Russia improve economic and social conditions in Spain, or the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, or Latin America, whose peoples need no goading from Moscow to feel a desire for improvement of their present condition. The United States and Britain have assumed responsibility, or had responsibility thrust upon them, in all areas of the world which they entered originally in search of economic or strategic advantages. They cannot evade their own obligations merely by blaming world unrest on Russia.

This does not mean that every move Russia makes can or should be defended, for Russia's conduct may be open to criticism in one instance, and understandable or even desirable in another. What should be avoided is the indiscriminate condemnation of all Russian actions in world affairs such as seemed to inspire Mr. Churchill's Fulton speech. Such indiscriminate condemnation can all too readily be interpreted—and not by Stalin alone—as due less to concern for standards of international morality than to

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a desire to check Russia at every point.

**WORLD CANNOT REMAIN STATIC.** Some people, while admitting that not everything Russia has done is evil, say they would feel less worried if Moscow would only state how far it intends to go. Desirable as that would be, it is difficult to see how any nation at a given moment in history can honestly give such information. Had the England of Queen Elizabeth's day, for example, been asked to define its ultimate ambitions, could it have been held to them, when English explorers and statesmen of later days saw new worlds to develop? Could George Washington, or Lincoln, have defined with precision just how far the United States would carry its flag, its trade, and its influence? What people usually mean when they ask Russia to specify its final goals is that they would like to see the world settle down to a condition of stability involving no further major changes. Admittedly that would be a more restful world. But human society has never found it possible to remain static for any length of time. Young nations contend with older ones for leadership and, having won, find themselves challenged in turn by newcomers on the world scene.

**IS RUSSIA DIFFERENT FROM GERMANY?** But, it may legitimately be asked, how then is Russia different from Germany or Japan? If we fought the aspirations of the Axis for a larger place in the sun, shall we not sooner or later have to fight Russia? Or, conversely, if we are to let Russia have its way, should we not have been equally tolerant with the Axis? That is a fair question, and it lies at the very core of Mr. Churchill's appeal for an Anglo-American military alliance. Mr. Churchill proved to be a wise and far-sighted Cassandra in the case of Germany at a time when many others in positions of leadership tragically miscalculated Hitler's objectives. For that reason alone, if for no other, he deserves a hearing—especially since some of the methods used by Russia toward neighboring countries are troublingly reminiscent of Hitler's methods.

The difference is that the kind of society the Russians are striving to create in the U.S.S.R.

—painfully, and at great cost in sacrifices of lives and materials—is a society to which masses of people in other, even more backward, areas of the world have been aspiring, usually with little support or sympathy from the Western powers. In that sense Russia's struggle at home is in harmony with the spirit of our times, and efforts to foster the creation, along its borders, of governments favorable to its system frequently find a response among the peoples of border countries. Not that these peoples want to be governed from Moscow, or even necessarily to adopt the Russian pattern; but they are impressed by what Russia has achieved in a quarter of a century, and would like to emulate that achievement. It might be answered that the Nazis, too, found sympathizers in the countries they sought to bring within their orbit. But here is a fundamental difference: Nazism itself was nurtured in a soil of decadent German capitalism and violent racialism that held no promise of growth for civilization, and attracted outside Germany the most reactionary elements in all circles. Nazism was a dead end. Russia, unlike Germany, is emerging from backwardness, not returning to it, and holds out a promise for the future.

The United States can hold out an even greater promise, with surer prospect of fulfilment because of our unequalled industrial productivity—provided we can make up our minds which side of the struggle of our times we are on. That does not mean that we must align ourselves with Britain against Russia, or with Russia against Britain. On the contrary, the best contribution we could make would be not to align with either, but instead to put our power squarely behind the United Nations Organization; to support and if possible initiate every practicable international action looking toward progressive broadening of freedom and opportunity for all; to eschew the counsel of our nationalists, who are just as dangerous to world peace as the nationalists of Britain or Russia; and to give peoples who are on the verge of despairing of democracy the hope that we have not succumbed to counsels of reaction and despair.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## WILL U.S. SEEK INTERNATIONAL ACTION AGAINST PERON?

On the basis of a partial tally of the three million votes cast in the Argentine elections of February 24, the candidate of the democratic opposition, Dr. José Tamborini, has conceded victory to Colonel Juan Domingo Perón. The position of the man who has for months been the power behind the presidency has been legalized by a popular vote that was no more fraudulent than many previous Argentine elections. The real fraud was committed long before the elections, when the Castillo government imposed martial law upon the country in December 1941, and at the close of 1943, when the men around President Ramírez closed down political parties, permitting

them to reorganize only on the eve of the elections.

**ARGENTINA IN REVOLUTION.** That the democratic opposition did not have time or opportunity to gather itself for an effective campaign against Perón's formidable police and labor machine is undeniable. But the most convincing explanation of Perón's surprisingly large majority lies in his genuine appeal to the rank and file of Argentine labor, rural and industrial alike, an appeal which the Conservatives and the Radicals, the major parties leagued against him, either would not or could not make during their own ascendancy. The men who took power in 1943, have seen what the opposition

has not entirely understood, namely that the country is in the grip of a revolution in which the conservative nineteenth century values of the landed "enlightened oligarchy" are giving way to new concepts in which the peon, the meat packer and the construction worker have suddenly assumed political importance. The nationalists, recognizing this, have approached labor with concessions of labor legislation and wage increases, which have obscured for all but the most enlightened of Argentine workers the fact that their freedom of action has at the same time been progressively curtailed.

The coalition of the Radicals, Progressive Democrats, Socialists and Communists, with equivocal support from the Conservatives, was confronted by the entire machinery of the state—the swollen police force, the Department of Labor and its controlled labor unions, the federally-controlled administrations of the provinces, and the Perón-inspired press and radio. The democrats made their appeal to the country on the basis of the evident need for a return to constitutional normality. But people's memories had to be long indeed to recall a period when "constitutional normality" had not meant a state of deadlock between these same parties which frustrated much legislative activity.

**U.S. VERBAL INTERVENTION.** The influence which the State Department's Blue Book had on the election results will probably long be a point of controversy among Argentines. The release on February 12 of captured German documents compromising high members of the present Argentine government and the preceding Castillo administration, and an accompanying analysis of the nazi-fascist character of the régime, were obviously designed to put on record at the height of the campaign the United States' view of the nationalist government. But the Democratic Union hesitated to make use of the Blue Book's evidence, while the Peronistas fell upon the document with glad cries as one more example of the "yanqui" government's private vendetta against their leader. Now that the issue has been resolved, there will be no lack of people in the opposition who will ascribe defeat to the intervention of the United States. But the inevitable risk of incurring this type of criticism was outweighed, in Washington's view, by the importance of putting its case directly to the Argentine people, through the medium of informing the other American Republics.

The Blue Book was the United States' trump card and perhaps its only card against Perón. Like previous indictments, it has failed and, until this coun-

try is in a position to do more than flay the Argentine government with words, the technique of verbal intervention will win us more enemies than friends in Latin America. One solution of this admittedly difficult situation—a situation in which retreat is almost as impossible as advance—is, of course, to recognize the Perón administration. There is an influential body of opinion in this country and abroad that is pressing for a decision on our part which will once more place relations with Argentina on a "normal" basis. As Perón cultivates the friendship and trade of the other great powers, notably Britain and Russia, the pressure of this group will become more insistent.

If, however, Washington adheres to its position, at least three possible choices are open to it within the framework of international action to which the United States subscribes:

1. This government, at a specially called inter-American conference, can press for a decision to withdraw diplomatic recognition from the Perón government, while at the same time exploring available means of implementing diplomatic sanctions by more concrete measures. Now, however, this approach seems to have even less chance of success than before, owing to the traditional Latin American insistence on automatic recognition of a government that has come into office by due process of law.
2. By supporting the French move to bring the Spanish question before the next meeting of the UNO Security Council, which opens in New York City on March 25, the United States might hope to isolate and bring pressure on the Argentine government. It can be argued that, owing to the peculiar influence that Spain exercises in its former colonies, the continuance of the Franco régime strengthens Perón's chances of survival. This approach, however, presupposes that the United States is ready to undertake stronger measures against the Spanish government than the tripartite note of March 5 indicated.
3. This government, finally, can propose to the Security Council that Argentina be suspended from the UNO. Since Europe desperately needs Argentine foodstuffs, it is appropriate and necessary that the European powers, France and Britain particularly, share the decision with the American Republics. Whatever course is taken, in the last analysis, it is a question of balancing the need for Argentine wheat and beef against the danger of fascism and aggression which the government of that country represents.


OLIVE HOLMES

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# Washington News Letter



## REPUBLICANS STILL DIVIDED ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

The strong influence which members of the minority party exert on the policies of the federal administration has become an important phenomenon on Capitol Hill. In recent years individual Republicans have helped in a positive way to frame the foreign policy of Democratic presidents by two different means. First of all, selected members of the minority party took part in the talks at the State Department in 1944 which formulated the United States official attitude toward international cooperation, and also participated in the San Francisco Conference in 1945, which brought forth the United Nations Charter. Lately, the minority has been influential in its more customary role, through criticism of the course followed by the Administration in seeking to achieve its goals in foreign affairs.

**REPUBLICANS MAY BECOME MAJORITY.** The Republican contribution to the making of foreign policy would be greater if leading Republicans could agree among themselves about the kind of policy they want to espouse. The task of agreement is complicated, however, not only by differences in outlook and emphasis on international questions, but by varying estimates of the type of foreign policy the voters are most likely to support in the 1948 presidential elections. This is an especially important consideration to the Republican leaders, since the possibility exists that they will gain control of the Administration at that time. And, more immediately, they may at least win a majority in the House of Representatives in this November's Congressional elections.

The most prominent Republicans who might seek the presidential nomination in 1948 include Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, the 1944 nominee; Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, a member of the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference and to the first meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in London in January and February; Senator Robert H. Taft of Ohio; John W. Bricker, former governor of Ohio; and Harold E. Stassen, former governor of Minnesota and a member of the United States delegation to the San Francisco conference.

**RECENT REPUBLICAN STATEMENTS.** Among Republican leaders there are some disagreements over the meaning of Russian foreign policy and over the attitude which the United States should adopt toward Russia. As a group they are uncertain

whether public questioning of Russian intentions is harmful or necessary to the cause of international cooperation. The problem of Russia disturbs Dewey, Vandenberg and Bricker particularly. At the municipal dinner in New York City on March 16 for Winston Churchill, who 10 days earlier had couched a plea for Anglo-American "fateful association" with harsh criticism of Russia, Dewey said: "As long as our two nations stand firmly for freedom, we shall never be long alone." The implied concern about Russia in Dewey's words had been put sharply by Vandenberg on February 27, when he said: "What is Russia up to now? It is of course the supreme conundrum of our time." While Vandenberg held himself to a consideration of Russian policy outside Russian boundaries, Bricker on March 13, at a forum of the Madison Avenue Presbyterian Church in New York City, criticized Russian domestic policy: "In Italy under Mussolini, in Germany under Hitler, in Japan under Tojo, and in Russia today under Stalin, the individual man is nothing. He exists only as the tool of the all-powerful state."

Stassen has criticized such proposals for association with Britain and such comments about Russia in the belief that they may injure the United Nations. "The best hope of the goal of peace is to develop and strengthen the United Nations Organization," Stassen said in St. Paul on March 14. "This means that the United States must not tie its foreign policy down to any other one nation, but develop a definite policy which is its own policy, plainly discussed with its own people, and open and clear to the world." In Toledo on February 22 he said: "We must begin at once a forthright search, on a bipartisan basis, for the specific policies with which we can expect continuing friendly relations with Russia. Then these policies should be frankly and firmly discussed with the Soviet Union."

The Republican with whom Stassen is most closely allied in his views on foreign affairs is Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., former Senator from Massachusetts, who, in addresses in January before the Foreign Policy Association branches in Minneapolis, St. Paul and Milwaukee, urged an attitude of restraint in comment on Russia. Stassen soon will test the strength of his opinions in his own state when he backs Minnesota's Governor Edward J. Thye in a campaign for the Senate seat held by isolationist Henrik L. Shipstead.

BLAIR BOLLES